Abstract-In this paper we propose a decentralized privacypreserving scheme for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), where nodes establish security associations. In order to achieve privacy and security, we use homomorphic encryption and polynomial intersection so as to find the common friends of two nodes. Through our experimental results we verify the correctness of our scheme given the limitations of MANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years' computers started becoming more and more important for our daily round, until they became an inextricable part of our lives. As a result, users started to set also new demands for connectivity. Wired solutions were just not enough, since there was an increasing request on for connecting to the Internet, reading and sending emails and changing information from anywhere in general. The solution to that wish, is offered by the so called ad hoc networks.
Unlike common wireless networks, ad hoc networks are characterized by the absence of any existing network infrastructure or centralized administration (decentralized wireless network) as well as the ease and speed of deployment. Such networks are highly dynamic and each node participates in the basic functions of the network like packet forwarding and routing, since there are no routers or access points. Ad hoc networks can operate in a stand-alone way or can be attached to a larger network.
The decentralized nature of ad hoc networks makes them appropriate for a variety of applications where infrastructures that support central nodes are not suitable, and may expand the scalability compared to typical wireless networks. In addition, ad hoc networks are suitable for situations where there is lack of an infrastructure. An ad hoc application is a self-organized application composed of mobile and autonomous devices interacting as peers, whose connections are made possible because of fairly close distances.
The nature of ad hoc networks in combination with the lack of any security infrastructure raise new security problems where the solutions for conventional networks are usually not sufficient [1] .
A. Our Contribution
In this paper we present a privacy-preserving scheme for MANETs. In order to do so, we use a recommendation system that each node takes into consideration before it decides to serve another node of the network. The proposed scheme does not use any central authority, since this is a superfluous requirement for MANETs. Apart from that, we make use of Homomorphic Encryption which help us in avoiding complex computations. In addition, possible malicious nodes will be responsible for making the most expensive computations in order to acquire some of the resources of another node in the network.
Following this introduction, the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze why trust management is important for the secure functioning of a network, in Section 3 we briefly discuss about different attacks on existing trust management schemes, in Section 4 we examine existing trust models and reputations systems that enhance security in ad hoc networks. In Section 5 we describe our scheme, that combines Homomorphic Encryption with a Recommendation System so as to achieve security and privacy, while in Section 6 we briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed scheme. In Section 7 we present our experimental results and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
II. TRUST
The concept of "Trust", originally derives from the social sciences and is defined as the degree of subjective belief about the behaviors of a particular entity. The following two definitions for Trust are given in [2] . Blaze et al. [3] first introduced the term "Trust Management" and identified it as a separate component of security services in networks. Security and Trust are two notions that are strongly connected to each other. These two notions are overlapping but not coinciding. An entity (node) can be trusted, if operates exactly as designed and expected and works without disruption.
In trust management schemes nodes in a network have in general two ways of collecting information about other nodes. They use either first-hand information (Direct Trust) or second-hand information (Third-Party Trust) in order to evaluate other nodes. A trust establishment framework evaluates neighboring nodes based on direct observations while trust relations between two nodes with no prior direct interactions are built through a combination of opinions from intermediate nodes.
• Third-Party Trust refers to a situation in which two nodes trust each other even though they have not previously exchanged packets or established any kind of communication. In such a situation, these nodes can trust each other if and only if they have a relationship with another node in the network that they trust, and that node guarantees for the trustworthiness of the other node.
• Direct Trust is when two nodes have already established a trusting relationship and they can communicate to each other immediately (at least for a specific period of time), without the need of a third-party. Closely related to trustworthiness, but with vital differences, is the concept of reputation and recommendation. Reputation can be considered as a measure of trustworthiness (in the sense of reliability) based on referrals or ratings from members of a network [2] .
In wired networks is much easier to create dominant Trust Management Systems since nodes do not have limitations such as energy consumption or limited computational resources. Furthermore, the topology of wired networks is not changing dynamically as in ad hoc networks. So, the development of trust management schemes to realistically reflect ad hoc networks and especially the characteristics of MANETs still remains an open issue.
Due to the unique characteristics of MANETs and the inherent unreliability of the wireless medium, the concept of trust in MANETs should be carefully defined. A detailed list with the main features of trust in MANETs can be found in [4] .
III. ATTACKS
In this section we briefly describe different types of attacks that mainly affect trust management and reputation schemes.
In general, in wireless networks, we categorize attacks as passive or active. In passive attacks, the attacker tries to collect important information about the network by eavesdropping on the routing traffic. By doing that, the attacker can be in position for example to understand which nodes are playing the most crucial role in a network, and try to compromise them in order to bring the whole network down. In general passive attacks do not interfere with the stored data and there are very difficult to detect since the attacked entity is unaware of the attack. In active attacks the attacker uses some of his resources so as to successfully change the content of a packet or to just disrupt communications in other parts of the network. This kind of attacks can result to several losses for the nodes of the network. Table I presents a list of both passive and active attacks.
Moving on to attacks that can be applied to the trust management system itself and reputation systems follows:
• Black hole / Gray hole attack: In black hole attack, the attacker simple drops all the packets that received and thus can perform a denial of service (DoS) attack. Gray hole is the improvement of black hole, since the attacker selective drops packets and thus it is more difficult to detect him [5] .
• Sybil Attack: An adversary initiates a disproportionate number of malicious peers in the network. Each time one of the peers is selected as a service provider, it provides a bad service, after which it is disconnected and replaced with a new peer identity [6] .
• Man in the Middle Attack: Malicious node can intercept the messages from a benevolent service provider peer to the requestor and rewrite them with bad services, making therefore the reputation of the benevolent peer to decrease. That participant could even maliciously modify the recommendations given by an honest peer, in order to benefit his/her own interests [6] .
• Newcomer Attack: A malicious node may remove their bad reputation/distrust by registering as a new user. The malicious node simply leaves the system and joins again for trust revocation, flushing out previous bad history and starting to accumulate new trust [4] .
• Malicious Pre-Trusted Nodes: Some or all the friends (nodes that are considered as trusted) of a node are compromised.
IV. RELATED WORK Trust establishment is concerning scientists for many years and lot of schemes have been developed to address that issue, not only in wired but also in wireless ad hoc networks. We can classify the different approaches into two categories. Those who use a central authority and those who use a self-organized approach.
J. Sen et al in [7] presented a trust establishment scheme for ad hoc networks based on distributed trust model. A trust initiator was introduced only in the system-bootstrapping phase to initiate the protocol. A fully self-organized trust establishment approach was then adopted to handle the dynamic topology of the network and the membership changes of the nodes, while ensuring trust establishment among the nodes with shorter trust chains and very high probability.
C. Papageorgiou et al in [8] proposed a dynamic trust establishment protocol that allowed nodes of an ad hoc network to establish security associations among each other in a distributed and peer-to-peer manner. The basis of the protocol was a node-to-node security handshake using a network-wide key that every node was preconfigured with.
A.A. Pirzada and C. McDonald, in [9] presented a model for trust-based communication in ad hoc networks which introduced the notion of belief and provide a dynamic measure of reliability and trustworthiness in an ad hoc network.
M. Raya et al in [10] argued that the traditional notion of trust as a relation among entities, becomes insufficient for emerging data-centric mobile ad hoc networks and they proposed a new framework for data-centric trust establishment.
PowerTrust [11] is a robust and scalable P2P reputation system which leverages the power-law feedback characteristics found applicable in dynamically growing P2P networks, either structured or unstructured.
R. Zhou et al in [12] proposed a gossip-based reputation system (GossipTrust) for fast aggregation of global reputation scores. It leverages a Bloom filter based scheme for efficient score ranking. GossipTrust does not require any secure hashing or fast lookup mechanism, thus is applicable to both unstructured and structured P2P networks.
Marmol in [13] proposed a novel trust model for wireless sensor networks (WSN) based on the bio-inspired algorithm of ant colony system. It allows to find the most trustworthy path leading to the most reputable service provider in a network. Its intrinsic nature makes it to be easily adaptable to sudden changes in the topology of the network as well as in the behavior of its participants.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME The proposed privacy-preserving scheme is not based on any central Trust Authority, instead every node of the network, is responsible to recognize whether a requesting node is Trustful, Malicious or Uncertain when there is no information about its previous behavior.
We consider the example of Figure 1 , where node 1 wants to communicate with node 2 . We distinct the following two cases:
1) node 2 has a first-hand information about node 1 and acts accordingly its belief. 2) node 2 has no direct information about node 1 . In that case, it has to find if it can trust node 1 or not by using second-hand information. In general we recognize the following cases:
• Trustful: node 2 serves the request.
• Malicious: A computational problem is send to node 1 , that needs to be solved at t (for example t ≤ 10sec).
If node 1 solves the problem correct and within the time interval t then node 2 serves the request, otherwise drops the connection.
• Uncertain: node 2 asks from node 1 to send which of the nodes in the network can give a recommendation for node 1 . So, if for example node 3 , node 4 and node 5 had established a trustful connection in the past with node 1 , node 1 would respond to node 2 by sending a set with the id's of these nodes. Then if node 2 has previously established trustful relationships with any of these nodes (node 3 , node 4 or node 5 ) it can ask them to give their opinion about node 1 . In all cases, the total level of trust for node 1 will have to be Trustful, so as to be served immediately (i.e node 3 → T rust, node 4 
→ Malicious, node 5 → T rust).
A problem that arises here is the fact that it is not secure to expose list of trusted nodes and their recommendations. It could be used by an attacker to collect information about node's trustful relations and compromise its privacy. Hence, we use homomorphic encryption to force the communication initiator to spend more computational resources than the one who is receiving the request.
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that permits performance of a specific algebraic operation (denoted by ⊗) on the plain text by performing a (possibly different) algebraic operation (denoted by ⊕) on the corresponding ciphertext. The homomorphic cryptosystems are used as a basic building block in many secure multiparty protocols. Several such cryptosystems have been proposed in the literature [14] , [15] . More formally, let us consider a public-key cryptosystem with the homomorphic property where encryption and decryption are denoted as E(.) and D(.) respectively. It means ⊕, can be used to perform summation on the encrypted data without decrypting them. Thus, we can find the encrypted sum of encrypted x and y; that is, E(x) ⊕ E(y) = E(x ⊕ y). Consequently, we are able to multiply encrypted data if only one of the multipliers is unencrypted. Homomorphic cryptosystems proposed in the literature define operation ⊗ as modular multiplication while ⊕ is defined as modular addition or XOR. As a simple example of a homomorphic cryptosystem, we can consider the RSA cryptosystem. It is easy to see that
, where (e, n) is a public key. In this case, both ⊕ and ⊗ are modular multiplications. However, in the context of secure multi-party computations, the most used cryptosystems define ⊗ as a modular addition [14] , [15] .
Our solution is based on the approach proposed in [16] to find privacy preserving intersection of two sets. Assuming that the first set represents a list of recommenders of node 1 and the second set is a list of trusted recommenders of node 2 . Then the intersection will represent a list of nodes that can recommend the first node and their recommendations are trusted by the second node.
A. Construction of the Polynomial
In order to find the intersection of two sets, we use the Freedman et al method [16] .
We assume that each node has selected public and private keys according to some homomorphic public-key crypto scheme. Let E ni (m) denote an encryption of m with public key of node n i , and D ni (m) denote a decryption of m with private key of node n i . We assume that
Lets assume that node 1 has k nodes that can recommend it. So the set with the recommenders of node 1 is defined as follows:
Because, we don't want to expose the content of R 1 to possible passive attacker(s) that may intercept the message(s) and to the receiver (node 2 ), we construct polynomial P of degree k from the set R 1 , such that the roots of P will be the elements of R 1 . As we can see from (2) the roots of P are the elements of set R 1 .
After node 1 has defined polynomial P (x), it encrypts the coefficients with its public key and sends to node 2 the encrypted coefficients of this polynomial. Node 2 receives a set of the encrypted coefficients (4):
Similarly, we suppose that node 2 has l friends, which are represented in set R 2 :
The two nodes have to find the intersection of sets R 1 and R 2 , in order to know which 'friends' have in common. But this cannot be found from node 2 (at least not without spending lot of computational resources) since the list it received is encrypted. So node 2 makes use of the homomorphic encryption properties, to calculate encrypted values of P (x) for each x from R 2 without knowing coefficients of P (x) in clear text or result of calculation.
That is, for each node n j from R 2 , node 2 can calculate polynomial without decrypting coefficients as follows:
So, node 2 creates the following set:
is sent back to node 1 who has to decrypt it in order to find if the two sets intersect (P (x) = 0 for at least one element x from R 2 )
In our case it's clear that:
which means that the only common 'friend' they have is n k+2 . So, node 1 will find its common friends with node 2 (in our example only node n k+2 ) and it will ask them to give their reputation opinion about node 2 . Since node 1 is communicating with node(s) that have previously established a trustful relationship, the cost of the communication is small. The same also holds for the next step where these nodes will communicate with node 2 in order to give their reputation for node 1 .
VI. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Reputation adjustment is a very crucial issue in trust establishment. There should be a standard way known to all nodes so as to facilitate the assignment of the reputation values for different kind of activities. In our approach, we have only three levels of reputation (Trustful, Malicious and Uncertain) and we do not use scoring like many other techniques.
However similar techniques proposed in literature can be used here. Apart from that, in order to handle situations where trusted nodes have been compromised, we introduce a time trust interval t T rust . If a node is considered to be trusted and initiates a connection after t T rust interval has passed, then its reputation level is automatically assigned to uncertain. This technique provides security in two different directions. First we make use of the concept that if someone is trusted "today", it does not mean that he should be also trusted "tomorrow". Second, we overcome a security flaw that exists in many systems with reputation scoring. If we use a score for each known node, then an attacker could either compromise a sufficient number of nodes with very high scores or alternately could actively participate in the network for a period of time for the purpose of gaining enough reputation points. These two methods could lead to powerful attacks, as each node's reputation will take time to decrease, allowing the attacker to operate with impunity for a longer period of time before he is labeled as malicious. Hence, our scheme is resilient to attacks such as black hole and gray hole.
In addition to three tier scoring, we propose a security system based on social networks approaches with a feedback structure. Initial communication between nodes will be determined according to mutually established "friends" on the network as well as the requesting node's feedback by these friends. Furthermore, we provide a level of privacy as well as integrity of the data, by using homomorphic encryption to encrypt the list of friends for every node in the network. The requesting node sends an encrypted list of its friends to the target node. The target node, in turn, adds its own list of friends to the encrypted message and sends it back. The properties of homomorphic encryption ensure that this stage requires negligible resources from the target node. Upon reception of the encrypted lists of friends, the initiating node checks the lists to find any common friends. Next the node communicate with the common friends for verification purposes. In the case where the initiating node does not find any common friends, notifies the target node who is responsible for creating a computational problem to send back to the requestor.
In addition to that, an attacker could perform a DoS attack by simply sending a huge list of fake friends. With this way, the node who is responsible for finding the common friends (node 1 ) will have to do many useless computations. A solution to this attack, is that the node who initiates the communication (node 1 ) will have to select nodes that trusts (at least in some degree). Let's suppose that node 1 has a few potential candidates to communicate. In the case that node 1 communicates with a not very trustful node and receives a large list from it, will simply drop the connection and will select another node (another candidate). In this case it would be quit difficult to initiate DoS attack since node 1 has the control.
Apart from that sybil and newcomer attacks that described in section 4 are effectively defeated since when a new node is registering to the network, the uncertainty level of trust is automatically assigned to it.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section the implementation of the proposed scheme is described.
In order to measure the effectiveness of our solution, we run our experiments in Java. Our testbed consists of a laptop computer with Intel Core Duo CPU P7450 at 2.13GHz, 6.00 GB of RAM running Windows 7 64-bit. For the purpose of our experiments, we constructed an instance of the Paillier's cryptosystem [14] with 512 bits modulus. Our experiments were implemented in a medium scale ad hoc network (Figure 1 ). When nodes wish to communicate with one of their neighbors, they broadcast a hello message, which contains the target node.
In our experiment we have calculated the total time needed for the encryption, decryption as well as the intersection of the polynomials in order to find the common friends. The results of this experiment can be found in Figure 2 . As we can see, in the case where the polynomial is of degree 5 (which means that it has 5 friends) the time until node 1 finds the common friends with node 2 is 0.78sec, while in the extreme case where the degree of the polynomial is 30 the time is 4.92sec which is also an affordable time even for devices like PDA's and mobile phones.
We have also measured the time that node 2 (the node who is receiving a request) spends in order to add its friends to the encrypted list of node 1 . From the results presented in Figure 3 , we can see that the time node 2 requires to share the friends list with node 1 is significant small, since even for the case where the polynomial is of degree 30 the time 978-1-4577-0681-3/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE that node 2 needs is less than 1sec. Hence, each node that receives a request spends an affordable amount of resources.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving scheme for securing MANETs. Our scheme make use of publickey cryptography in order to protect/enhance privacy among nodes. An advantage of the proposed scheme is that we avoid complex computations due to homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, provides resilience to attacks that mostly affect trust management schemes such as sybil and newcomer attacks. In addition to that we show how DoS attacks can be also avoided. Finally, as a future work we are planning to create mechanisms that will allow the integration of our method from existing trust management schemes in order to make more effective decisions about the purposes of a node.
